The security of contemporary homomorphic encryption schemes over cyclotomic number field relies on fields of very large dimension. This large dimension is needed because of the large modulus-tonoise ratio in the key-switching matrices that are used for the top few levels of the evaluated circuit. However, larger noise (and hence smaller modulus-to-noise ratio) is used in lower levels of the circuit, so from a security standpoint it is permissible to switch to lower-dimension fields, thus speeding up the homomorphic operations for the lower levels of the circuit. However, implementing such field-switching is nontrivial, since these schemes rely on the field algebraic structure for their homomorphic properties.
Introduction
The last few years have seen a rapid advance in the state of fully homomorphic encryption, yet despite these advances, the existing schemes are still too expensive for many practical purposes. In this paper we make another step forward in making such schemes more efficient. In particular, we present a technique for reducing the dimension of the ciphertexts involved in the homomorphic computation of the lower levels of a circuit. Our techniques apply to homomorphic encryption schemes over number fields, such as the schemes of Brakerski et al. [4, 5, 3] , as well as the variants due to López-Alt et al. [14] and Brakerski [2] .
The most efficient variants of these schemes work over number fields of the form Q(ζ) ∼ = Q[X]/F (X), and in all of them the field dimension n, which is the degree of F (X), must be set large enough to ensure security: to support homomorphic evaluation of depth-L circuits with security parameter λ, the schemes require n =Ω(L · polylog(λ)), even under the strongest plausible hardness assumptions for their underlying computational problems (e.g., ring-LWE [15] ). 1 In practice, the field dimension for moderately deep circuits can easily be many thousands. For example, to be able to evaluate AES homomorphically, Gentry et al. [13] used circuits of depth L ≥ 50, with a corresponding field dimension of over 50,000.
As homomorphic operations are performed, the ratio of noise to modulus in the ciphertexts grows. Consequently, it becomes permissible to use lower-dimension fields, which can speed up further homomorphic computations. However, since we must start with ciphertexts from a high-dimensional field, we need a method for transforming them into small-field ciphertexts that encrypt the same (or related) messages. Such a "field switching" procedure was described by Brakerski et al. [3] , in the context of reducing the ciphertext size prior to bootstrapping. The procedure in [3] , however, is specific to number fields of the form K 2 k = Q[X]/(X 2 k−1 + 1), i.e., cyclotomic number fields with power-of-2 index. Moreover, by itself it cannot be combined with the "packed evaluation" techniques from [18, 11] . (These techniques use Chineseremainder encoding to "pack" many plaintext values into each ciphertext, and then each homomorphic operation is applied to all these values at once. For our purposes, we must consider the effect of the fieldswitching operation on all these plaintext values.) Extending and improving the field switching procedure is the goal of our work.
Our Contribution
We present a general field-switching transformation that can be applied to any cyclotomic number field K = Q(ζ m ) ∼ = Q[X]/Φ m (X) for arbitrary m (where Φ m (X) ∈ Z[X] is the mth cyclotomic polynomial), and works well in conjunction with packed ciphertexts. For any divisor m of m, our procedure takes as input a "big-field ciphertext" c over K that encrypts many plaintext values, and outputs a "small-field ciphertext" c over K = Q(ζ m ) ∼ = Q[X]/Φ m (X) ⊆ K that encrypts a certain subset of the input plaintext values. 2 Our transformation relies heavily on the algebraic properties of the cyclotomic number fields K, K and their respective rings of (algebraic) integers R, R . In particular, we use the interpretation of K as an extension field of K , and relationships between their various embeddings into the complex numbers C; the factorization of integer primes in R and R ; and the trace function Tr K/K that maps elements in K to the subfield K . With these tools in hand, the transformation itself is quite simple, and consists of the following three steps:
1. We first apply a key-switching operation to obtain a big-field ciphertext over K with respect to a small-field secret key s ∈ K ⊂ K. Proving the security of this operation relies on a novel way of embedding the ring-LWE problem over K into K, which may be of independent interest.
2. Next, we multiply the resulting ciphertext by a certain element of the ring R ⊂ K, which depends only on the subset (or other function) of the plaintext values that we want to include in the output ciphertext.
3. Finally, we take the trace of all the K-elements in the ciphertext, thus obtaining an output ciphertext over the subfield K , which decrypts under the secret key s ∈ K to the desired plaintext values.
We note that in addition to being simpler and more general than the transformation from [3] , our transformation is also more efficient even when applied in the special case of K 2 k : when switching from K 2 k to K 2 k , the transformation from [3] includes a step where the size of the ciphertext (and hence the time that it takes to perform operations) is expanded by a factor of 2 k−k . Our transformation does not need that extra step, hence saving this extra factor in performance.
In Section 2 below we recall the algebraic concepts needed for our transformation, and then the transformation itself it described in Section 3.
Preliminaries
For any positive integer u we let [u] = {0, . . . , u − 1}. Throughout this work, for a coset z ∈ Z q = Z/qZ we let [z] q ∈ Z denote its canonical representative in Z ∩ [−q/2, q/2). One can also view [·] q as the operation that takes an arbitrary integer z and reduces it modulo q into the interval [−q/2, q/2).
Algebraic Background
Recall that an ideal I in a commutative ring R is a nontrivial (i.e., I = ∅ and I = {0}) additive subgroup which is closed under multiplication by R. For ideals I, J, their sum is the ideal I + J = {a + b : a ∈ I, b ∈ J}, and their product IJ is the ideal consisting of all sums of terms ab for a ∈ I, b ∈ J. An R-ideal p is prime if ab ∈ p (for some a, b ∈ R) implies a ∈ p or b ∈ p (or both). All the rings we work with have unique factorization of ideals into powers of prime ideals, and a Chinese Remainder Theorem. A fractional ideal is, informally, an ideal with a denominator. Formally, letting K be the field of fractions of R, a fractional ideal of R is a subset I ⊆ K for which there exists a denominator d ∈ R such that dI ⊆ R is an ideal in R. For an R-ideal I, the quotient ring R I = R/I consists of the residue classes a + I for all a ∈ R, with the ring operations induced by R. More generally, for a (possibly fractional) ideal I and an ideal J ⊆ R, the quotient I J = I/IJ is an additive group, and an R-module, with addition and multiplication operations induced by R. We often write a mod I instead of a + I to denote the residue classes a + I, and we write a = b (mod I) to denote that a, b belong to the same residue class, i.e., a + I = b + I.
For computational purposes, all of the rings and fields we work with have efficient representations of their elements, and efficient (i.e., polynomial time in the bit length of the arguments) algorithms for all the operations we use. For quotients A/B, cosets are represented using a fixed set of distinguished representatives. In this work we largely ignore the details of concrete representations and algorithms, and refer to [16] for fast, specialized algorithms for working with the cyclotomic fields and rings that we use in this work.
Cyclotomic Fields and Rings
For a positive integer m, let K = Q(ζ m ) be the mth cyclotomic number field, where ζ m is an abstract element of order m. (In particular, we do not view ζ m as any particular root of unity in C.) The minimal polynomial of ζ m is the mth cyclotomic polynomial
, where ω m = exp(2π √ −1/m) ∈ C is the principal mth complex root of unity, and the roots ω i m ∈ C range over all the primitive complex mth roots of unity. Therefore, K is a field extension of degree n = ϕ(m) over Q, and is isomorphic to the polynomial ring Q[X]/Φ m (X) by identifying ζ m with X (there are other representations as well). The ring of (algebraic) integers in K, called the mth cyclotomic ring, is
The field extension K/Q has n automorphisms τ i : K → K that fix Q pointwise, which are characterized by
e., the number of automorphisms equals the dimension of the extension), the Q-linear 3 (field) trace Tr K/Q : K → Q can be defined as the sum of the automorphisms:
(See below for another formulation.) Similarly to the automorphisms τ i (which map K to itself), there are n concrete ways of viewing K as a subfield of the complex numbers C. Namely, there are n injective ring homomorphisms from K to C that fix Q pointwise, called embeddings, which are denoted σ i : K → C for i ∈ Z * m and characterized by σ i (ζ m ) = ω i m . The embeddings may be seen as the compositions of the abstract automorphisms τ i with the complex embedding that identifies ζ m ∈ K with ω m ∈ C. Therefore, the field trace can also be written as the sum of the embeddings, as Tr K/Q (a) = i∈Z * m σ i (a) ∈ Q. The canonical embedding σ : K → C n is the concatenation of all the complex embeddings, i.e., σ(a) = (σ i (a)) i∈Z * m , and it endows K with a canonical geometry. In particular, define the Euclidean ( 2 ) and ∞ norms on K as
because the σ i are ring homomorphisms.
Towers of Cyclotomics
For any positive integer m dividing m, let K = Q(ζ m ) and R = Z[ζ m ] be the m th cyclotomic field and ring (of dimension n = ϕ(m ) over Q and Z), respectively. As above, the field extension K /Q has n = ϕ(m ) automorphisms τ i : K → K and n complex embeddings σ i : K → C (for i ∈ Z * m ), the latter of which define the canonical embedding σ : K → C n .
We will use extensively the fact that K is a field extension of K , and R is a ring extension of R , both of dimension n/n (because K/Q and K /Q have dimensions n and n , respectively). That is, K and R may respectively be seen as a subfield of K = K (ζ m ) and a subring of R = R [ζ m ], under the ring embedding that identifies ζ m with ζ m/m m . Moreover, the field extension K/K is Galois, i.e., it has n/n automorphisms that fix K pointwise, which are precisely those τ i for which i = 1 (mod m ). This follows from the fact that
and that reducing modulo m induces an (n/n )-to-1 mapping from Z * m to Z * m . The K -linear (intermediate) trace function Tr K/K : K → K may be defined as the sum of these automorphisms:
A standard fact from field theory is that the intermediate trace satisfies
Similarly to Equation (2.1), for any i ∈ Z * m the embedding σ i coincides with σ i mod m on the subfield K . Using this fact we get the following relation between the intermediate trace and the complex embeddings of K and K . Lemma 2.1. For any a ∈ K and i ∈ Z * m ,
In matrix form, σ (Tr K/K (a)) = P · σ(a), where P is the ϕ(m )-by-ϕ(m) matrix (with rows indexed by i ∈ Z * m and columns by i ∈ Z * m ) whose (i , i)th entry is 1 if i = i (mod m ), and is 0 otherwise.
Proof. Fix an arbitrary k ∈ Z * m such that k = i (mod m ). Then because σ i coincides with σ k on K , and by definition of Tr K/K and linearity of σ k , we have
where for the last equality we have used σ k • τ j = σ k·j and k ∈ Z * m , so i = k · j ∈ Z * m runs over all indices congruent to i modulo m when j ∈ Z * m runs over all indexes congruent to 1 modulo m .
An immediate corollary is that the intermediate trace maps short elements of K to short elements of K .
The rows of P are orthogonal (since each column of P has exactly one nonzero entry), and each has Euclidean norm exactly n/n .
Prime Splitting and Plaintext Arithmetic
We now describe the factorization ("splitting") of prime integers in cyclotomic rings, how it allows for encoding and operating on several finite-field elements, and the particular functions induced by the (intermediate) trace function Tr K/K . Further details and proofs can be found in many texts on algebraic number theory, e.g., [19] .
Prime splitting. Let p ∈ Z be a prime integer. In the mth cyclotomic ring R = Z[ζ m ] (which has degree n = ϕ(m) over Z), pR is often not a prime ideal, but instead factors into prime ideals as follows. One useful explicit representation of the prime ideals p i , and the isomorphisms between R/p i and (some canonical representation of) F p d , is as follows. 4 Modulo p (i.e., in F p [X]), themth cyclotomic polynomial factors into f distinct irreducible degree-d polynomials, as Φm(X) = i∈G F i (X) (mod p), and the mth cyclotomic polynomial factors as
Then each p i is generated by p and
, and
The displayed subscripts indicate a choice of representatives from the cosets of the multiplicative subgroups 2 ⊆ Z * 7 and 2 ⊆ Z * 91 , which have orders d = 3 and d = 12, respectively.
Let ωm denote some arbitrary element of orderm in F p d . (Such an element exists because the multiplicative group F * p d is cyclic and has order p d − 1 = 0 (modm).) Then for any i ∈ G, the polynomial F i (X) splits into linear factors over the extension field F p d as
Therefore, fixing for each i ∈ G some arbitrary representative u i ∈ i p ⊆ Z * m , we get a concrete isomorphism between the quotient R/p i and F p d , which is characterized by ζ m → ω u ī m . (Note that ζ m has orderm modulo p.) Looking ahead, these isomorphisms will be used to define several "plaintext slots" in a homomorphic cryptosystem, i.e., an encoding of f plaintext elements of F p d in a single element of R/2R, which is the plaintext space of the cryptosystem.
Splitting in cyclotomic towers. Of course, the above derivation also applies to the ideals that lie over p in R = Z[ζ m ] ⊆ R. For each such ideal p , we next describe the factorization of p R into prime ideals in R. These are the prime ideals that lie over p in R, and since "lying over" is an associative property, they also lie over p (as illustrated in Figure 1) .
Letm, d, e, f, G and the prime ideals p i for i ∈ G be as above for R, and definem , d , e , f , G = Z * m / p and prime ideals p i for i ∈ G similarly for R . Note that d |d, e |e, and f |f , and that the natural homomorphism g : G → G defined as g(i) = i modm is surjective and (f /f )-to-1. Then for every i ∈ G , the factorization of p i R is
Therefore, there are f /f prime ideals of R lying over each p i , and taken over all i ∈ G they partition the prime ideals of R lying over p.
By the above and the Chinese remainder theorem, the natural ring homomorphisms yield the following (where ∼ = denotes a ring isomorphism, and multiplication in F f and F f is coordinate-wise):
(Note that the first homomorphism in each line is surjective, but not necessarily an isomorphism, due to possible ramification.) Following [18, 3, 11, 12, 13] , in the context of homomorphic encryption the above morphisms allow for encoding a vector of f individual elements of F (respectively, f elements of F) into the plaintext ring R p = R/pR (resp., R p = R/pR), so that a single homomorphic addition and multiplication acts component-wise on the underlying vectors of field elements.
Trace operations. As mentioned in the introduction, our field-switching technique is built around applying the trace function Tr K/K to the elements of a big-field ciphertext, thus obtaining a related small-field ciphertext. Since we use "packed" ciphertexts that encrypt arrays of elements in F via the above isomorphisms, we need to understand the effect of the trace function on those F-elements. The remainder of this subsection is therefore devoted to characterizing the functions (F f /f ) f → F f that can be induced by Tr K/K . More specifically, we determine exactly which functions
It turns out that by fixing an appropriate choice of isomorphisms between the quotient rings and finite fields above, we can obtain the concatenation of any f individual F -linear functions F f /f → F (see Corollary 2.5 for a precise statement). 5 As already noted, the isomorphisms between the quotient rings and finite fields are not necessarily unique; they are determined by the choice of representatives u i ∈ i p ⊆ Z * m and u i ∈ i p ⊆ Z * m , and roots of unity ωm ∈ F and ωm ∈ F. For our purposes below, it is important to choose these in a "consistent" fashion, as follows. Given ωm, let ωm = ωm 
(Note that such u i always exist, by definition of g and the quotient group G.) We denote the isomorphisms obtained from these choices by
Also, for each i ∈ G denote the product of prime ideals lying over p i in R, called the radical of p i R, bỹ p i = i∈g −1 (i ) p i , and define the ring isomorphism
In Lemma 2.4 below, we show that under the above isomorphisms, the F -linear functionsL : F f /f → F correspond bijectively with the R -linear functions L : R/p i → R /p i (for any i ∈ G ). Recall that any function of the latter type can be expressed as L(a) = Tr K/K (d · a) for some fixed d ∈ K. Conversely, every function L (with domain and range as above) that can be expressed as L(a) = Tr K/K (d · a) is clearly R -linear, so it always induces an F -linear function. The heart of Lemma 2.4 is the following fact. Lemma 2.3. Let p i for some i ∈ G be a prime ideal lying over p in R , and letp i be the radical of p i R. Let r ∈ R ⊆ R be arbitrary, and let s = h i (r mod p i ) ∈ F ⊆ F. Theñ
i.e., every entry ofh i (r modp i ) is equal to h i (r mod p i ). 
For each i ∈ g −1 (i )
To see this, note that by Lemma 2.3 and the fact thath is a ring homomorphism, for any r ∈ R and a ∈ R/p we haveh
So, by F -linearity ofL and the fact that h is a ring homomorphism, we have
An application of the Chinese remainder theorem with the prime idealsp i in R, combined with Lemma 2.4, immediately yields the following corollary.
Corollary 2.5. Let p = i ∈G p i and p = i ∈G p i be the radicals of pR and pR, respectively. Then under the isomorphisms {h i } i ∈G and {h i } i ∈G defined above, the R -linear functions L : R/p → R /p are in bijective correspondence with the functionsL : (
We note that given a functionL of the above form, we can efficiently find an R -linear function L : R → R that induces the corresponding L. Fix an arbitrary R -basis B = {b j } of R. Then using the isomorphisms h i andh i , the values of L(b j mod p) ∈ R /p are determined byL, and uniquely define L by R -linearity. We can then define eachL(b j ) ∈ R to be an arbitrary representative of L(b j mod p); these choices uniquely determineL, by R -linearity. Finally, we can representL explicitly in trace form aŝ L(a) = Tr K/K (d · a) for some d ∈ K: recalling that K is a vector space over K with K -basis B, we have a full-rank system of linear equationsL(b j ) = Tr K/K (d · b j ) ∈ K , which we can solve to obtain d ∈ K.
Duality
An important and useful object in K is the dual of R (also known as the codifferent of K), defined as
Because Tr K/Q = Tr K /Q • Tr K/K , it is easy to verify that also R ∨ = {a ∈ K : Tr K/K (aR) ⊆ R ∨ }. Therefore, we have the convenient equation
Note that by contrast, frequently Tr K/K (R) does not equal R , but is instead some proper ideal of it. 6 Many other algebraic and geometric advantages of working with R ∨ instead of R are discussed in [15, 16] . The codifferent is a principal fractional ideal, i.e., R ∨ = t −1 R for some t ∈ R (which is not unique). Therefore, division by t induces a bijection from R to R ∨ , and from any quotient ring R p = R/p to R ∨ p = R ∨ /pR ∨ . Although the target objects are not rings (because R ∨ · R ∨ ⊆ R ∨ ), they are R-modules, and the bijections are R-module isomorphisms.
Of course, we also have R ∨ = t −1 R for some t ∈ R . By Equation (2.2) and K -linearity of the trace, for any ideal p in R , we have
In the previous subsection we considered R -linear functions L : R → R (or their induced functions R p → R p ), which can always be expressed as
is not in R because Tr K/K (R) = R , but it is easy to see that d ∈ t R ∨ always, because if not, then Tr K/K (dR) ⊆ t R ∨ = R . For the purposes of our field-switching procedure, it will be more convenient to instead work with corresponding R -linear functions from R ∨ to R ∨ , which can be represented in trace form by elements of R. Namely, for an R -linear function L : R → R , where L(a) = Tr K/K (d ∨ · a) for some d ∨ ∈ t R ∨ , we will consider the corresponding function
Following [16] , we extend the operation [·] q to R ∨ p by fixing a particular Z-basis of R ∨ (and Z q -basis of R ∨ q ), called the decoding basis, and representing the argument as a Z q -combination of the basis vectors and applying the [·] q operation to each of its coefficients. It is shown in [16, Section 5.2] that every sufficiently short (as always, under the canonical embedding) e ∈ R ∨ is indeed the "canonical" representative of its coset modulo qR ∨ . Specifically, if e < q/(2 √ n) then [e mod qR ∨ ] q = e.
Good Bases of R and R ∨
In this subsection we construct certain "good" bases of the ring R and its dual R ∨ in terms of R and R ∨ (respectively), and prove some of their useful geometrical properties. This (somewhat technical) material is used only in Section 3.1, where we prove the hardness of ring-LWE over K with secret in R , assuming its hardness over K with secret in R .
Since K is a vector space of dimension n/n over K , the field K has a K -basis (which is not unique), i.e., a set of n/n elements of K that are linearly independent over K , so that every element of K can be represented uniquely as a K -linear combination of the basis elements. Similarly, an R -basis of R is a set of n/n elements in R, such that every element of R can be represented uniquely as an R -linear combination of the basis elements. An R ∨ -basis of R ∨ is defined analogously.
We wish to construct an R -basis of R, and a corresponding dual R ∨ -basis of R ∨ (any of which are K -bases of K), which are "good" in the following sense: for any vector of K -coefficients (with respect to the basis) which are short under σ , the corresponding K-element is also short under σ. More formally, represent an ordered K -basis of K as a vector b = (b j ) ∈ K n/n , and similarly for an arbitrary vector of K -coefficients a = (a j ) ∈ K (n/n ) , which defines the K-element a = a, b = j a j · b j . Then by linearity, the basis b induces a matrix B ∈ C n×n such that
We seek an R -basis b of R for which B (nearly) preserves Euclidean norms up to some scaling factor, i.e., all of its singular values are (nearly) equal. In addition, for any 
Lemma 2.6 implies that for any
More generally, if the a j are independent and have Gaussian distributions over (the canonical embedding of) K , then a and a ∨ also have (possibly non-spherical) Gaussian distributions over K. 7 Since we are not too concerned with the exact distributions, we omit a precise calculation, which is standard. However, one particular case of interest is when the a j are all i.i.d. according to a spherical Gaussian of parameter s, and r ∈ {1, 2} so that B (respectively, B ∨ ) is a scaled unitary matrix. Then because spherical Gaussians are invariant under unitary transformations, a (resp., a ∨ ) is distributed according to a spherical Gaussian of parameter s m/m (resp., s m /m). The remainder of this subsection is devoted to proving Lemma 2.6. We denote the k-dimensional identity matrix by I k , we use ⊗ to denote the Kronecker (or tensor) product of vectors and matrices, and we apply functions to vectors and matrices component-wise. Hence, using the commutativity of the Kronecker product (up to some permutation) we can factor the powerful basis p of R as
Because p is a Z-basis of R , it follows that b is an R -basis of R. We next calculate the matrix B ∈ C n×n induced by b, and verify that it indeed satisfies the claims in the lemma statement. i.e., the columns of CRT m are σ(p j ) for each entry p j of the row vector p T . In particular, σ( c, p ) = CRT m · c for any c ∈ Q n . Similarly, σ (( p ) T ) = CRT m up to a row permutation. We now claim that, up to some permutations of B's rows and columns, 6) where the second equality follows by the mixed-product property and the commutativity (up to row and column permutations) of the Kronecker product. To see the first equality, notice that for any a ∈ K (n/n ) defining a = a, b ∈ K, the matrix (CRT −1 m ⊗ I) maps from (a suitable permutation of) the concatenated embeddings σ ( a), to a vector c ∈ Z n of coefficients such that a = c, p ⊗ I n/n . In addition, 
Homomorphic Cryptosystems
In ring-LWE-based cryptosystems for arbitrary cyclotomics [16] (generalizing those of [15, 4, 3] ), the plaintext space is R p for some integer p ≥ 2 that is coprime with all the odd primes dividing m. (We assume that p is prime, which is really without loss of generality since we can always use the Chinese remainder theorem.) Ciphertexts are elements of (R ∨ q ) 2 for some integer q that is coprime with p, and the secret key is some s ∈ R. A ciphertext c = (c 0 , c 1 ) ∈ (R ∨ q ) 2 that encrypts a plaintext b ∈ R p with respect to s satisfies the decryption relation
for some sufficiently short e ∈ R ∨ such that t · e = b (mod pR). (Recall that R ∨ = t −1 R for some t ∈ R, so t · e ∈ R.) We refer to e as the noise of the ciphertext. Throughout this work we implicitly assume that the modulus q is large enough relative to e , so that [c 0 + c 1 · s] q = e ∈ R ∨ (see Section 2.1.4 above). Therefore, the decryption algorithm can simply compute e and output t · e mod pR. As shown in [4, 3, 16] , this system (augmented by some additional public values, for greater efficiency) supports additive and multiplicative homomorphisms.
The Field-Switching Procedure
Our procedure performs the following operation. Given a big-field ciphertext c ∈ (R ∨ q ) 2 that encrypts a plaintext b ∈ R p with respect to a big-ring secret key s ∈ R, and a description of an R -linear function L : R p → R p to apply to the plaintext (where recall that p and p are the radicals of p in R and R , respectively), it outputs a small-field ciphertext c ∈ (R ∨ q ) 2 that encrypts b = L(b) ∈ R p with respect to some small-ring secret key s ∈ R . (Recall that Corollary 2.5 characterizes how L corresponds to the induced function L : F f → F f that is applied to the vector of finite field elements encoded by b.)
The procedure consists of the following three steps:
1. Switch to a small-ring secret key. We use the key-switching method from [5, 3, 16] to produce a ciphertext which is still over the big field K and encrypts the same plaintext b ∈ R p , but with respect to a secret key s ∈ R ⊆ R belonging to the small subring.
2.
Multiply by an appropriate (short) scalar. We multiply the components of the resulting ciphertext by a short element d ∈ R that corresponds to the desired R -linear function to be applied to the input plaintext b.
3. Map to the small field. We map the resulting big-field ciphertext (over R ∨ q ) to a small-field ciphertext (over R ∨ q ) by simply taking the trace Tr K/K of its two components. The resulting ciphertext will still be with respect to the small-ring secret key s ∈ R , but will encrypt the plaintext b = L(b) ∈ R p .
Note that Steps 2 and 3 can be repeated multiple times on the same ciphertext (from Step 1), to apply several different R -linear functions. In this way, the entire input plaintext can be preserved, but in a decomposed form.
Step 1: Switching to a Small-Ring Secret Key
To switch to a small-field secret key, we publish a "key-switching hint," which essentially encrypts the big-ring secret key s ∈ R under the small-ring key s ∈ R , using ciphertexts over the big field. Note that encrypting under a small-ring secret key has security implications, since the dimension of the underlying RLWE problem is smaller. In our case, however, the whole point of switching to a smaller field is to obtain ciphertexts of a smaller dimension, so we do not actually lose any additional security by publishing the hint. Indeed, we show below that assuming the hardness of the decision RLWE problem in the small field, the key-switching hint reveals nothing about the big-ring secret key. The essence of that claim is Lemma 3.1 below, which says (informally) that RLWE in the big field, with secret chosen in the small ring R ⊆ R, is no easier than RLWE in the small field.
Ring-LWE. The ring-LWE (RLWE) problem [15] (in K) with continuous error is parameterized by a modulus q, a "secret distribution" υ over R, and an "error distribution" ψ over K, which is usually a Gaussian (in the canonical embedding) and is therefore concentrated on short elements. 8 For s ∈ R, define the distribution A s,ψ that is sampled by choosing α ∈ R ∨ q uniformly at random, choosing ← ψ, and outputting the pair (α, β = α · s + mod qR ∨ ) ∈ R ∨ q × K/qR ∨ . One equivalent form of the (average-case) decision RLWE q,ψ,υ problem (in K) is, given some pairs (α i , β i ) ∈ R ∨ q ×K/qR ∨ , distinguish between the following two cases: in one case, the pairs are chosen independently from A s,ψ for a uniformly random s ← υ (which remains the same for all samples); in the other case, the pairs are all independent and uniformly random over R ∨ q × K/qR ∨ . For appropriate parameters q, ψ, υ and , solving this decision problem with non-negligible distinguishing advantage is as hard as approximating the shortest vector problem on ideal lattices in R, via a quantum reduction. See [15, 16] for precise statements and further details.
Let b ∨ = (b ∨ j ) j∈[n/n ] be any R ∨ -basis of R ∨ , and hence a K -basis of K. Then for any error distribution ψ over K , we can define an error distribution ψ over K as ψ = ψ (n/n ) , b ∨ , i.e., a sample from ψ is generated by choosing independent j ← ψ (for j ∈ [n/n ]) and outputting = j j b ∨ j ∈ K.
Lemma 3.1. Let ψ be an error distribution over K , and let ψ = ψ (n/n ) , b ∨ be the error distribution over K as described above. If the decision RLWE q,ψ ,υ problem (in K ) is hard for some distribution υ over R ⊆ R, then the decision RLWE q,ψ,υ problem (in K) is also hard.
Although the lemma holds for any R ∨ -basis of R ∨ , it is most useful with a basis having "good geometric properties." Specifically, in our case we need the property that if ψ is concentrated on short elements of K , then ψ is similarly concentrated on short elements of K. Such a basis b ∨ is constructed in Lemma 2.6 of Section 2.1.5. For example, if ψ is a continuous (spherical) Gaussian with parameter s and r = rad(m)/ rad(m ) = 1, then ψ is a spherical Gaussian with parameter s m /m = s n /n. 9 Proof. It suffices to give an efficient, deterministic reduction that takes n/n pairs (α j , β j ) ∈ R ∨ q × K /qR ∨ and outputs a single pair (α, β) ∈ R ∨ × K/qR ∨ , with the following properties: if the pairs (α j , β j ) are 8 Again, to be completely formal, a Gaussian should be defined over K R ; see Footnote 7. 9 Note that the factor n /n ≤ 1 does not really amount to any effective decrease in the noise, because the "sparsity" of R ∨ versus R ∨ is greater by a corresponding factor.
i.i.d. according to A s ,ψ for some s ∈ R , then (α, β) is distributed according to A s,ψ ; and if the pairs (α j , β j ) are independent and uniformly random, then (α, β) is uniformly random. The reduction simply outputs (α = α, b ∨ , β = β, b ∨ ), where α = (α j ) j and β = (β j ) j . Since b ∨ is an R ∨ -basis of R ∨ and hence an R ∨ q -basis of R ∨ q , it is immediate that the reduction maps the uniform distribution to the uniform distribution. On the other hand, if the samples (α j β j ) are drawn from A s ,ψ , i.e, β j = α j · s + j mod qR ∨ for j ← ψ, then α is still uniformly random, and
where = ( j ) j and has distribution ψ. This completes the proof.
Key switching. In [5, 3, 16] it is shown how, given an s ∈ R and sufficiently many RLWE samples (over K) with short noise and any secret s ∈ R, it is possible to generate a "key-switching hint" with the following functionality: given the hint and any valid ciphertext c (over K) encrypted under s and with sufficiently short noise, it is possible to efficiently generate a ciphertext c (also over K) with short noise encrypted under s . Moreover, the hint is indistinguishable from uniformly random over its domain (even given s), assuming that the RLWE samples are. For our transformation, we apply Lemma 3.1 using the "good basis" b ∨ from Lemma 2.6, thus obtaining RLWE samples over K relative to the secret s ∈ R ⊆ R, with noise distribution ψ which is concentrated on short vectors, and with security based on the hardness of RLWE q,ψ ,υ problem in K . We then construct the key-switching hint from these samples as described in [16, Section 7 .3],
Steps 2 and 3: Mapping to the Small Field
Our goal now is to transform a valid big-field ciphertext c = (c 0 , c 1 ) ∈ (R ∨ q ) 2 , which encrypts some b ∈ R p with respect to some secret key s ∈ R ⊆ R, into a small-field ciphertext c = (c 0 , c 1 ) ∈ (R ∨ q ) 2 that encrypts the related plaintext b = L(b) with respect to the same secret key s , where L : R p → R p is any desired R -linear function.
The process works as follows:
1. Since L is R -linear, by the discussion at the end of Section 2.1.3 and in Section 2.1.4, we can find some d ∨ ∈ t R ∨ such that L(a) = Tr K/K (d ∨ · a) mod p .
2. We then find a short representative d ∈ (t/t )d ∨ + pR ∈ R p , using a "good" basis of pR (i.e., one that has small singular values under σ, e.g., the "powerful" basis as constructed in Section 2.1.5).
The chosen d defines the R -linear function with noise e = L ∨ (e) ∈ R ∨ of length e ≤ e · d ∞ · n/n , where e is the noise in the original ciphertext c.
We note that the factor n/n in the bound on e does not actually amount to any effective increase in the noise, because the dimension has decreased by a corresponding factor, and hence the size of e relative to R ∨ remains the same as that of e relative to R ∨ . More precisely, the original ciphertext c decrypts correctly if q > 2 √ n e , whereas c decrypts correctly if q > 2 √ n e (see Section 2.1.4). Therefore, the only practical increase in the noise is due solely to d ∞ .
Proof. We need to show three things: that e is bounded as claimed, that c 0 + c 1 · s = e (mod qR ∨ ), and that t · e = b = L(b) (mod p ). 3. For the last claim, because t · e = b mod pR and by Equation (3.1), we have
Applying the Field-Switching Procedure
A typical application of the field-switching procedure during homomorphic evaluation of some circuit will begin with a big-field ciphertext that encrypts an array of plaintext values in the subfield F , as embedded in F. 10 The above procedure is then applied to decompose the ciphertext into a number of small-field ciphertexts, each encrypting a subset of the plaintext values. Since big-field ciphertexts have room for f plaintext elements, but small-field ciphertexts can only hold f elements, we may need up to f /f small-field ciphertexts to hold all the plaintext values that we are interested in. That is, we apply our field-switching transformation using the f -fold concatenationsL f i of the F -linear selection functionsL i : F f /f → F , i ∈ [f /f ], whereL i just selects the ith value (in F ). 11 Referring to Figure 1 for an example, the big-field ciphertext holds (up to) six plaintext values, and each small-field ciphertext can hold two values, with the big-field plaintext "slots" corresponding to p 1 , p 15 , p 22 lying over the small-field plaintext slot of p 1 , and the big-field slots corresponding to p 3 , p 17 , p 31 lying over the small-field plaintext slot of p 3 . Then we can produce three small-field ciphertexts, using the three selection 
